Although many had already pronounced the offence of blasphemy dead, 2 or at least moribund, 3 the abolition of these ancient offences in such an understated way has caught many by surprise. 4 The purpose of this article is to explain what has been lost, to explore why blasphemy has been abolished now and to examine the extent to which the criminal law still nevertheless protects religious beliefs and believers.
'chameleon-like' capacity to adapt to changed social conditions, 9 it was possible to outline the essence of the offence.
10
The actus reus of blasphemy was to publish 'blasphemous' material in any form.
11
To be 'blasphemous', the content of the material had to be both in conflict with the tenets of the Church of England and couched in indecent or offensive terms likely to shock and outrage the feelings of the general body of Church of England believers.
The extent to which the law protected Christian denominations other than the Church of England was an open question. Indeed, by the nineteenth century judicial pronouncements were becoming increasingly confused. In Gathercole's Case 12 , for instance, it was noted that a person could lawfully attack 'any sect of the Christian Religion (save the established religion of the country)' because the Church of England alone is 'the form established by law, and is therefore a part of the constitution of the country'. However, the judgment continued to state that 'any general attack on
Christianity is the subject of criminal prosecution, because Christianity is the established religion of the country'. 13 Nevertheless, as it was made clear in 
'Blasphemous' material could be published in a written or verbal form.
12 (1838) 2 Lewin 237. 13 See also Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law which defined blasphemous matters as those 'relating to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible, or the formulation of the Church of England as by law established':
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1950) article 2.14, quoted by the House of Lords in R v Lemon, R v Gay News [1979] AC 617.
Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) 35 The failure of the Article 10 claim was also fatal for the Article 9 claim since interference would be justified under Article 9 (2) on the same grounds as under Article 10 (2). An argument on grounds of Article 14 (discrimination in the enjoyment of a Convention right) was also dismissed since there was no evidence that the applicants were discriminated against on account of their homosexual views or of beliefs not shared by confessing Christians.
Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) shown did not breach the filmmaker's Article 10 rights to freedom of expression since the interference was prescribed by law, had a legitimate aim in protecting the Convention rights of others and was necessary in a democratic society given the pressing social need to ensure religious peace in that region and was proportionate in that authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation. 37 The fictional novel tells the story of two men: one of whom is divided between his attraction to life in the East and his attraction to life in the West; the other is divided between his desire to believe in God and his inability to believe in God. The first man survives by returning to the East; the second is unable to return to his religious beliefs and finally kills himself. and licking the body of Christ, and placing her hand in his which he then holds. 42 Compare the decision of the Commission who held that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society. The total ban was disproportionate. Since the film was a video rather than cinematic release, it was unlikely to be displayed to general public. Its short length meant conscious decision to view was required so no there was pressing social need.
Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) 
Select Committee on Religious Offences
Established 'to consider and report on the law relating to religious offences', the
House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales
identified two main strands of their inquiry: whether existing religious offences (notably blasphemy) should be amended or abolished and whether a new offence of incitement to religious hatred should be created and, if so, how. 56 Although the Report was light in terms of definite conclusions, it did note that there was a gap in the law and seemed reluctant to see blasphemy filling that gap. The Report concluded that the future of the common law offence of blasphemy 'may not depend upon legislation but upon the contemporary climate, both social and legal, which could lead to a decision to take no action at all'. 57 The Report also expressed the view that the offence of blasphemy was a dead-letter, contending that 'any prosecution for 55 n 52 above [31] . 56 House of Lords Select Committee , n 6 above, chapter 1, para 1. 57 Ibid, para 139.
Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) 14 blasphemy today … is likely to fail on grounds either of discrimination or denial of the right to freedom of expression'.
58
The Report made three distinct contentions in this respect. First, the report contended that the Wingrove decision that blasphemy was in the UK's 'margin of appreciation'
does not mean that it will continue to be Convention compatible: 'the Court's decision in Wingrove that there was not 'as yet…sufficient common accord' to mean that the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006
The 69 The Government had wanted the offence to be charged either when the defendant had the intention to stir up religious hatred or was being reckless as to whether religious hatred would be stirred up thereby.
The Government had also wanted to include 'abusive or insulting' words or behaviour in addition to 'threatening'. injurious to morality'. The High Court held that this applied to the offence of blasphemy, which was a common law offence, the essence of which was such 85 She added that, given the long delay and the circumstances in which the offence had been invoked, the application bordered on the vexatious but that this was not a reason for her decision.
Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) 87 The claimant had contended that the she had fettered her discretion by treating the issue before her as being concluded by two previous findings of other bodies in relation to the play: in R (the Christian Institute) v BBC c/1378/2005, Crane J had dismissed a judicial review into the decision to broadcast the production on the basis that submissions contending a breach of the Corporation's Charter and Article 9 ECHR did not constitute an arguable case and the BBC Governors had also rejected a complaint. The
Court dismissed this claim, since it was apparent that the District Judge did not regard the issue before her as a decision for anyone but herself. There was no sign that she had placed too much weight upon these decisions but in any event, weight was a matter for the primary decision-maker, not for the High Court.
88 Ibid [8] .
Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) 71(6) Modern Law Review 971-986.
22
The High Court thus undermined many of the human-rights based reasons given for the need to abolish blasphemy. However, in their place, it added two new dimensions to the debate. The significant curtailing of the blasphemy law by the Theatres Act 1968 coupled with the recognition of the high threshold that needed to be proved, including evidence of societal damage moved the debate on. It is quite extraordinary that the impact of the Theatres Act 1968 was previously ignored in the debate concerning whether the blasphemy offences should be abolished: it is not mentioned, for example, in the report by the House of Lords Select Committee. This, in itself, however, did not mean that abolition was inevitable since the demanding requirements of the actus reus of the offence had long been recognised. 89 Perhaps, more important, was the High Court's insistence that the offence of blasphemy was alive and could still be elucidated.
Although Green v The City of Westminster
Magistrates' Court revealed that the potential for a blasphemy prosecution was small, it also served as a reminder that the offence lay dormant rather than dead and could in special circumstances be revived in much the same way as it was in the Gay News case. Although the House of Lords refused to hear the case judicially, it was not to be long before Parliament dealt with the offence of blasphemy yet again.
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
On 9 
